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Abstract:
This research focuses on foreign intervention in the mining sectors of Zambia and the 
Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), concentrating on the transparency of agreements and reg-
ulation, or lack thereof, contributing to the longevity of mining practices and the livelihoods of 
local citizens. The current state of public information regarding natural resource extraction in both 
countries creates questions about state motives and investors’ economic incentive, with conse-
quences of inequality, human rights offenses, and underdevelopment. Applying Immanuel Waller-
stein’s world-systems theory, I describe the economic rationale behind global involvement in the 
region’s mining operations and identify potential power imbalances. I use commodity statistics, 
state documentation, and nongovernmental reports to analyze reporting trends on mining opera-
tions. Intergovernmental databases with development statistics also contribute to the research. In 
this study, I argue foreign intervention in underdeveloped, mineral rich countries does not have to 
be a purely exploitative relationship as emphasized by Wallerstein’s theory, demonstrated through 
the implementation of international transparency initiatives. These programs, implemented for the 
benefit of the resource abundant countries like Zambia and the DRC, can increase the accountabil-
ity of governments and investing companies related to mining activities. Complete reporting on 
natural resource extraction increases investment values and the development and productivity of 
the mining industry.
Introduction
Walking into an American mall on a Saturday afternoon, the typical scene 
greeting the eye involves busy shoppers in-
terspersed with rows of electronic gadgets, 
sparkling jewelry, and newfangled applianc-
es. With little thought to sourcing, construc-
tion, or ethical concerns, consumers buy into 
the latest fads and go about business as usual, 
assuming companies and governments deal 
with the go-between details honorably. How-
ever, the process is more complex. Exposed 
by the media, depicted in films, and protest-
ed by nonprofit organizations, the mining 
of natural resources used to make cherished 
products has become somewhat controversial 
recently, yet little is known about it to the av-
erage consumer.
The manufacturing of high-demand com-
modities uses raw materials extracted from 
specific resource abundant areas of the globe. 
The geographic region in Central Africa en-
compassing Zambia and the Democratic Re-
public of Congo (DRC) is home to many of 
the world’s most valuable natural resources. 
As of 2015, the DRC owned an estimated 
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$24 trillion worth of mineral assets, primar-
ily made up of gold, copper, diamond, col-
tan, and cobalt deposits (“DR Congo: UN 
Advises,” 2011). Similarly, Zambia, while 
possessing other resources as well, specializ-
es in copper extraction, holding some of the 
most productive reserves in the world (“Zam-
bia: Exports,” n.d.). Historically and into to-
day, the extreme wealth of natural resources 
between the two countries entices investors 
on a global scale, leading to the potential for 
successful business partnerships, but also 
dangers of corrupt and manipulative systems 
of extraction. Prioritizing capitalist self-inter-
ests, multinational corporations (MNCs) risk 
exploiting these resources.
Demand for raw materials to engineer 
high-value products motivates international 
interest in resource-rich countries like Zambia 
and the DRC. Globalization and technologi-
cal advances in mining and manufacturing 
during the early twentieth-century coincided 
with colonial rule in Africa. Colonial powers 
extracted raw materials from the continent to 
fulfill European capitalist motives, while also 
reconstructing the political spheres of Af-
rican nations. Both countries won indepen-
dence in the 1960s from European coloniz-
ers—Zambia from Britain and the DRC from 
Belgium—entering a tumultuous (and in the 
case of the DRC, bloody) period of economic 
and political adjustment (Sikamo, Mwanza, 
& Mweemba, 2016; “DR Congo: Chronolo-
gy,” 2009). During this time, in an attempt 
to regain economic stability and increase in-
ternational recognition, Zambian and Congo-
lese governments encouraged multinational 
corporations to engage in mining activities 
within national borders (Sikamo, Mwanza, & 
Mweemba, 2016; “DR Congo: Chronology,” 
2009). Thus began a new boom of foreign in-
vestment and involvement in the mining in-
dustry, leading to more indirect international 
infiltration into the economic and political 
structures of each country. In recent years, as 
these trends continue, so does resource ex-
traction.
Despite obvious mineral extraction and 
the development of relationships between 
foreign companies and the states, a pattern 
has appeared across the industry: data and 
statistics about mining activity is incomplete, 
unbalanced, or completely absent. Gaps in 
data disclosure allow conflicts and inequal-
ities in the mining sector to fester, enabling 
powerful companies and governments to ex-
ploit both resources and miners. In the DRC, 
resource smuggling and fraudulent report-
ing benefit political elites financially, while 
71% of Congolese citizens live in extreme 
poverty (“Executive Summary, DRC,” n.d.). 
Zambia, while not as politically turbulent, 
also maintains years’ worth of gaps in min-
ing statistics (“Commodity Trade Statistics 
Database,” 2017). Speculation about foreign 
interests affecting the transparency of min-
ing operations—meaning business contracts, 
revenues, or changes in ownership—raises 
ethical concerns and questions of legitimacy 
for investors and consumers. While Zambi-
an and Congolese governments and mining 
companies see value in transparent reporting, 
strategic interests take precedence, subse-
quently dictating the type and amount of data 
available to the general public.
In this paper, I explore foreign interven-
tion regarding mining operations in Zambia 
and the DRC, analyzing whether the actions 
of international transparency initiatives cor-
respond with Immanuel Wallerstein’s the-
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oretical idea of relationships between the 
developed world and its less developed coun-
terparts. The study examines public infor-
mation involving natural resource extraction 
and relationships of state governments, in-
ternational investors, and non-governmental 
organizations. Wallerstein’s world-systems 
theory conceptualizes the economic rationale 
behind global involvement in regional mining 
operations and analyzes foreign intervention 
in evolving markets. In accordance with the 
theoretical framework, problems within the 
mining sector can be attributed to develop-
mental power imbalances. I apply the theory 
to mines in Zambia and the DRC, two miner-
al-rich countries with different economic and 
political environments. The study analyzes 
mining regulation and public records to iden-
tify data gaps and incentivize participation 
in accountability initiatives. Involvement in 
transparency programs could improve the 
value of investments and accountability of 
the whole mining industry.
I argue foreign intervention in underde-
veloped, mineral rich countries does not have 
to be a purely exploitative relationship, as 
shown by the implementation of international 
transparency initiatives. At the onset, I pres-
ent the economic, social, and political effects 
of multinational investment in mining natural 
resources. Next, I introduce world-systems 
theory and the concept of development in 
core-periphery relationships, with applica-
tion to foreign intervention in extracting min-
eral wealth from Zambia and the DRC. The 
methods section underlines data collection of 
mining activities between the two countries 
and provides analysis of transparency initia-
tives. Next, I relate world-systems theory to 
resource extraction in Zambia and the DRC 
and postulate further to prove a non-exploit-
ative core-periphery relationship is possible. 
Lastly, I highlight the significance of inter-
national accountability programs within the 
mining industry and show the importance 
of state and public support to the success of 
such initiatives.
LITERATURE REVIEW
Economic Effects of Extractive Investments
Within the scope of economics, govern-
ments push investor-friendly policies de-
signed to entice foreign involvement through 
tax incentives and reductions in regulation. 
Since the structural adjustment period of 
the 1980s, foreign investments have become 
economically appealing to many African 
economies. The privatization of natural re-
sources places more control in the hands of 
large international firms, therefore limiting 
the state’s ability to monitor resource own-
ership and management trends. For example, 
with the emergence of neoliberal economic 
policies, foreign influence over the Zambian 
national economy has weakened national sta-
bility and bargaining power (Larmer, 2005, 
pp. 43-44). Global institutions such as the 
International Monetary Fund and the World 
Bank encourage privatization as leverage for 
debt assistance and financial support (Lungu, 
2008, p. 408). To take advantage of foreign 
capital and maintain economic stability, Af-
rican states often rely upon natural resource 
wealth to boost international investment. 
The privatization of previously state-owned 
entities plays into the strategy, choosing to 
privilege outside investors over domestic in-
terests. A public record of investments and 
contracts adds legitimacy to the industry and 
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could justify continued negotiations between 
states and external actors.
Based on economic principles, multina-
tional corporations build investments from 
strategic agreements with intentions of prof-
itability and market expansion. Multination-
al corporations (MNCs) implement plans 
to extract resources at the expense of weak 
national governments, thanks to free mar-
ket expansion. Within strategic investment 
agreements, operating countries grant deduc-
tions and exemptions to companies who then 
routinely avoid paying corporate taxes, on 
the grounds of maintaining these investments 
for contracted periods of time (Lungu, 2008, 
p. 407). As profitability comes first, MNCs 
do not hesitate to interfere in domestic issues 
or political conflicts to protect shareholder 
interests, even under the risk of damaging the 
operating country (Saleem, 2002, pp. 112-
113). Large MNCs control power structures 
and mining securities, creating exploitative 
systems of resource extraction. Consequen-
tially, by not prioritizing long-term African 
resource security, multinational investments 
could jeopardize the stability of African 
economies. The companies’ conflicts of in-
terest could threaten national authority and 
sustainable economic growth. States can take 
significant steps towards mitigating compa-
nies’ conflicts of interest by releasing clear 
public records of all mining transactions.
The role of the state as the primary driv-
er of political and economic forces becomes 
increasingly muddied due to the upswing of 
commercial relationships with foreign com-
panies, according to social scientists. Weak-
ened political institutions coupled with a 
strong multinational presence do not create 
a stable view of people-centered sustainable 
development. The crippling economic effects 
of the resource curse can be linked to struc-
tural shortcomings in bureaucratic institu-
tions (Idemudia, 2009, p. 19). For example, 
overwhelmingly dependent on oil, Nigeria’s 
economic history demonstrates the state is 
not equipped with the management capabil-
ities necessary for efficient industry regula-
tion and reform (Idemudia, 2009, pp. 17 and 
3). African economies have become substan-
tially dictated by outside interests rather than 
domestic needs, potentially contributing to 
an increased lack of stability within national 
power structures. The complexity of resource 
relations requires a strong state presence in 
the face of manipulative interference in order 
to maintain a sense of national sovereignty 
and legitimacy. 
Additional Effects of Multinational Mining
As previously mentioned, the lack of 
transparent regulatory frameworks in the 
mining sector provokes cycles of resource 
exploitation and social inequalities, accord-
ing to social scientists. The state and multi-
national corporations engage in negotiations 
containing tax breaks and business con-
cessions to incentivize foreign investment, 
despite the threat of long-term economic 
degradation. Both parties can undertake re-
sponsibility to create and release clear, struc-
tured agreements, laying out the details of 
continued mining projects, particularly in the 
cases of conflict minerals. Proposals such as 
the Extractive Industries Transparency Initia-
tive (EITI) encourage national governments 
and international corporations to voluntari-
ly commit information about extractive in-
volvement to boost business repute and polit-
ical legitimacy (Le Billon, 2006, p. 98). With 
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international platforms, civil society groups 
can push law reform towards initiatives such 
as EITI to better gauge government expen-
ditures and accountability related to foreign 
intervention (Lungu, 2008, p. 412) Corrupt 
mining agreements between state entities 
and multinational corporations run the risk 
of inciting ethnic conflict and militant ac-
tivity, further incentivizing governments to 
provide complete reporting (Kemp, Owen, 
Gotzmann, & Bond, 2011, p. 105). With the 
high concentration of mining activities in the 
Central African Copperbelt, a lack of trans-
parent regulation can potentially hurt the 
credibility of international companies and the 
state. Based on research into social respon-
sibility standards, engagement in policy re-
forms could increase the accountability of the 
industry and boost local standards of living. 
Such research could illuminate problematic 
patterns within the mining sector and subse-
quent solutions to improve sustainability.
Company-community relations create the 
potential for advocacy and social change in 
the mining industry. With opposing cultural 
dynamics at play, multinational corporations 
and affected communities work through var-
ious social conflicts and ethnic differences. 
Facing financial and legal issues, local com-
munities become more assertive with natural 
resource management. Advocates protest for 
labor rights and environmental conservation, 
but often run into strong corporate bureau-
cracy seeking to silence opposition (Talla, 
2010, p. 113). Company-community conflict 
heightens with management negligence and 
institutional repression of local protests, es-
pecially regarding indigenous lands (Kemp 
et al., 2011, p. 95). Advocacy is a social tool 
with the potential to activate transparent reg-
ulatory structures within the mining sector. 
Research into such structural benefits could 
also support communities affected by foreign 
mining investments.
Corporate citizenship initiatives have be-
come a trend within the sphere of econom-
ics, stemming from grassroots advocacy 
movements and collective action protests. 
Participating in constructive development 
work or engagement projects benefits MNCs, 
improving community relations and adding 
legitimacy to investments. For example, the 
Canadian government has prompted nation-
al mining companies to engage in efforts to 
broaden corporate accountability initiatives 
and improve human rights records in conflict 
zones (Le Billon, 2006, p. 106).  Other inter-
national mining companies have also laid out 
frameworks for community feedback struc-
tures to air mining grievances, with goals to 
increase local dialogue and resolve disputes 
(Kemp et al., 2011, p. 94). Current trends in 
corporate action show a potential for change 
within the extractive sector, but also empha-
size structural imbalances of the capitalist 
system. The desire for profit runs the risk of 
dominating social responsibility and conse-
quently continuing a cycle of exploitation at 
the expense of local livelihoods. 
World-Systems: A Critique of Inequality
Within the realm of social science, 
world-systems theory seeks to clarify social 
and economic power differentials between 
countries in varying stages of development. 
Immanuel Wallerstein (2004) analyzes histo-
ry and economic markets to highlight inequal-
ities between strong and weak states. Based 
on the theory, the relationship of the “core” 
to the “periphery” can appear patronizing, as 
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core states attempt to control the social and 
economic success of less developed nations. 
The core, having been developed longer and 
more substantially, provides a model for the 
periphery to encourage growth, but also takes 
advantage of the periphery’s lack of devel-
opment by exhausting peripheral resources. 
(Wallerstein, 2004, p. 10). World-systems 
theory critiques the exploitative power re-
lations of the world, predominantly seen in 
core states (Babones, 2014, p. 5). Such pow-
er imbalances can be common in post-colo-
nial African governments and markets. Pe-
ripheral states depend upon core states for 
support, linking peripheral economic and 
political success to more developed nations. 
World-systems theory explains exploitative 
trends in economic relationships between Af-
rican nations and the West. 
More developed states assert expertise, 
gleaned from years of political and eco-
nomic shifts in the world-system, upon the 
less-developed peripheral nations and can 
subsequently dictate the outcomes of essen-
tial domestic elements, such as land, labor, 
and capital. Foreign economic involvement 
intensifies the inequalities of core-periphery 
relationships. Systemic inequalities can be 
deeply rooted in a colonial past of exploita-
tion and oppression. Western Europe colo-
nized much of what is known as the “Third 
World,” leaving behind a state of underde-
velopment explaining current social turmoil 
(Chirot & Hall, 1982, p. 83). Furthermore, 
international influence can obstruct develop-
ment, as the addition of foreign capital into 
a developing economy could cause potential 
market manipulation and a corrupt redistribu-
tion of wealth and power (Wellhofer, 1995, 
p. 504). Multinational corporations play a 
leading role in the exploitative relationships 
between the core and periphery, extract-
ing benefits from peripheral resources and 
withdrawing to the core with the profits. As 
world-systems theory maintains, the global 
market often supports the economic goals of 
multinational companies, gaining strength 
from powerful capitalist-centered nations. 
Holding MNCs accountable through trans-
parent reporting could create a more equal 
economic system of exchange, thus lessening 
chances of social and political tensions in un-
derdeveloped states. 
According to world-systems theorists, 
the core strips the periphery of resources and 
establishes standards to protect self-interests. 
Stronger countries are thus able to dictate ad-
vantageous trade terms. On the other hand, 
weak states are unable to fight dominant 
powers and could lose important aspects of 
domestic production like labor and capital 
to the core. The core can assert exploitative 
power through labor and property regulation, 
subsequently damaging peripheral economic 
goals (Wallerstein, 2004, p. 46). Poor eco-
nomic growth in peripheral nations shows 
the disproportionate correlation between 
production and compensation in developing 
countries. (Wellhofer, 1995, p. 504). Interna-
tional mining companies invested in the Cen-
tral African Copperbelt epitomize powerful 
core interests in peripheral environments. 
World-systems theory illustrates resource and 
labor exploitation in developing countries.
Within the scope of economics, world- 
systems theory critiques capitalism. Achiev-
ing profitability is the primary objective of 
capitalist initiatives. In placing profit as the 
first priority, the concept of unequal exchange 
characterizes core-periphery relations, de-
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scribed in a theoretical context as the move-
ment of capital from weak regions to strong 
regions, regardless of the risks of inequality. 
In the capitalist economy, core nations move 
means of production to locations of the low-
est cost, usually the less developed sectors 
of the periphery (Wallerstein, 2004, pp. 26-
27). International institutions like the World 
Bank and International Monetary Fund es-
tablish development programs to encourage 
economic investments supporting the capi-
talist interests of the core (Gowan, 2004, p. 
492). An internationally-instigated push to-
wards the privatization of natural resources 
complements capitalist goals for maximizing 
profit. Thus, world-systems theory criticizes 
the economic strategies the core employs for 
extraction purposes and the consequent ex-
ploitation of the periphery. Transparency ini-
tiatives could provide a solution to economic 
discrepancies between the two poles.
DATA AND METHODS
While researching, I utilized official re-
ports from governmental agencies in Zambia 
and the Democratic Republic of Congo. With-
in the data, I searched for investment patterns 
and efforts towards transparency through for-
mal documentation of mining projects and 
agreements between companies and the state. 
I accessed several governmental databases 
for each country to find mining news and sta-
tistics, such as the Zambia Chamber of Mines 
and the Ministère des Mines of the DRC. 
While I primarily used African-sourced doc-
uments, I also accessed Section 1504 of the 
Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Con-
sumer Protection Act from the United States 
National Archives. I used the part of the doc-
ument focusing on the transparency of multi-
national mineral extraction in African regions 
including the countries of Zambia and the 
DRC. By using official government reports, I 
can monitor state response to mining projects 
and assess the level of public disclosure of 
mining activities. 
To round out the data, I accessed reports 
and primary data from non-governmental and 
inter-governmental organizations as well. I 
utilized the African Power Mining Projects 
archive, an initiative seeking to provide ob-
jective public disclosure of mining projects 
across the African continent. The files in-
clude critical extractive information about 
forty-seven mines in various regions of Zam-
bia and the Democratic Republic of Congo. 
The data shows significant trends in relation 
to factors such as private or state ownership, 
commodity, and amount produced for export. 
I also utilized studies on mining performance 
and production from the World Bank to gauge 
the success of development programs. Non-
state affiliated, development-centered organi-
zations like the United Nations and the World 
Bank collect reliable date through reputable 
studies, and I found multiple reports on min-
ing activities from these organizations. 
To analyze qualitative research, I utilized 
thematic coding as a principle means of anal-
ysis. I read the literature, highlighted poten-
tial points of importance, and created data 
files to store for later application. As many 
of the Congolese archival sources were only 
available in French, I created corresponding 
files in English to prevent potential linguistic 
confusion. I laid the Zambian and Congolese 
mining contracts side-by-side to compare the 
strategic clauses employed by both parties. 
Thanks to the thematic codes, I discovered 
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the vernacular of the mining industry. I also 
identified common trends of proactivity re-
garding company acknowledgment and re-
sponse to the challenge of sustainability. The 
patterns I found within the data illustrate the 
logic of using thematic coding as the primary 
form of analysis.
Faced with quantitative data, I used a 
method of summary statistics to narrow down 
the findings. For example, to analyze the sta-
tistics from the African Power Mining Proj-
ects database, I organized the information into 
a specific spreadsheet more relevant to the 
DRC and Zambia. While the previous report 
was vast, containing data for over four hun-
dred mines, I restricted the spreadsheet to for-
ty-seven mines, a number more conducive for 
analysis. I then utilized maps of both countries 
to create a visual basis of mine concentration. 
With a smaller number of mines to analyze, I 
can spot production patterns and differences 
between the mines in respect to geographic lo-
cations. Furthermore, using a strategy of sum-
mary statistics for all of the quantitative data, 
I can more specifically identify comparative 
trends between Zambia and the DRC.
ANALYSIS
External interests threaten national sov-
ereignty over mineral reserves and the po-
tential for economic wealth, simply by the 
sheer number of foreign investors. Foreign 
ownership dwarfs domestically owned com-
panies in the mining sectors of Zambia and 
the Democratic Republic of Congo. Of the 
forty-seven prominent mines analyzed across 
the geographic area of both countries, mul-
tinational companies own and operate for-
ty, with a majority, if not all of the shares 
in each mine (“African Mines Project Data-
base,” 2010). Mine privatization contributes 
to this trend, as foreign bidders take prece-
dence during mining negotiations, effective-
ly limiting ownership opportunities by more 
localized Zambian or Congolese companies 
(Serlemitsos & Fusco, p. 25). Thus, smaller, 
nationally-based companies are largely un-
able to compete for influence and ownership. 
Privatization, through limiting power to the 
state and redistributing it to multinational 
players with capitalist motivations, could in-
crease the risks of domestic problems, such 
as unemployment and labor inequalities. In a 
Wallerstein world, MNCs represent influen-
tial international actors playing a controlling 
role in a potentially exploitative relationship 
between the powerful corporate world and 
the less powerful mines. 
Mining companies investing in Zambia 
and the DRC, in conjunction with state gov-
ernments, engage in established initiatives to 
increase transparent regulation and to address 
economic discrepancies. However, these 
initiatives have not been headed by nation-
al governments, but by outside institutions 
seeking to hold the industries accountable. 
For example, the United Nations General As-
sembly backed the Kimberley Process Cer-
tification Scheme (KPCS), which attempts, 
through state regulatory requirements, to 
hold the diamond industry accountable re-
garding the influx of conflict diamonds into 
the legitimate trade (The Role of Diamonds, 
2002). Mining contracts between the Congo-
lese diamond mining company, La Societé 
Minière de Bakwanga (MIBA), and de Beers 
Centenary reference a commitment to the 
certification system in business negotiations, 
showing adherence to the principles of an es-
57
tablished regulatory framework such as the 
KCPS (Protocole d’Accord, 2005). Similarly, 
the Extractive Industries Transparency Initia-
tive, established in 2003 as the flagship glob-
al transparency standard, has incentivized the 
governments of both Zambia and the DRC to 
release information about expenditures and 
any relationships with mining companies to 
the public (“The EITI Standard 2016,” 2016). 
Efforts toward established regulatory frame-
works for transparency, such as the EITI, 
mostly originate outside the state. Thus, in-
ternational transparency initiatives attempt to 
hold both Zambia and the DRC, along with 
multinational investors, accountable. 
Critics could suggest states may active-
ly choose to disregard intervening pressure 
to implement government transparency pro-
grams, citing such decisions could threaten 
national interests. In the same way multi-
national companies do not want to release 
data with potentially negative consequenc-
es, states might desire to take a protectionist 
stance against external inference in national 
regulatory standards, particularly regarding 
mining. For example, in conflict-ridden coun-
tries such as the DRC, to release information 
detrimental to particular ethnic factions car-
ries the potential to instigate tensions seem-
ingly much greater than publishing revenue 
numbers (Kemp et al, 2011, p. 105). Fur-
thermore, foreign direct investment inflows 
account for $1.7 billion worth of both the 
Congolese and Zambian GDP (“General Pro-
file: DRC,” 2015; “General Profile: Zambia,” 
2015). Consequently, foreign economic pow-
er invested in the mining sector of Zambia 
and the DRC could overshadow the states’ 
commitment to ethical business practices and 
transparent industries. This tendency increas-
es the importance of international pressure 
for transparency. To accommodate states’ 
refusal to provide details on mining revenue 
and activity would reiterate the exploitative 
core-periphery relationship world-systems 
theory proposes.
International transparency legislation 
challenges world-systems’ description of 
manipulative core-periphery interactions. A 
Wallerstein view would expect transparen-
cy initiatives to pursue self-interests while 
taking advantage of Zambian and Congolese 
mining actors seeking to comply with the 
implemented criteria for reporting. Yet, pro-
grams act only to increase data accessibili-
ty to the public. In 2015, the Ministère des 
Mines of the DRC, in adherence with EITI 
standards, released 126 mining contracts and 
official documents to the public through the 
ResourceContracts.org database (Okenda, 
Pedersen, Toledano, & Young, 2017). The 
Columbia Center on Sustainable Investment 
and Natural Resource Governance Institute 
began this initiative in 2015, supported by 
the World Bank and United Kingdom’s De-
partment for International Development. The 
program promotes a platform of “general 
data accessibility for all” and aims to accom-
modate corporate, media, and governmental 
goals for due diligence in reporting (“Open-
LandContracts.org,” n.d.). While focusing 
on transparency issues within the DRC, this 
international initiative and other likeminded 
programs do not seek to exploit the host coun-
tries Wallerstein would label “peripheral.” As 
the database’s mantra states, the objectives of 
such programs are purely to educate and raise 
awareness of statistical discrepancies.
Skeptics of this interpretation might 
question the motives of inter-governmental 
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organizations (IGOs) and nongovernmental 
organizations (NGOs) seeking to promote 
transparency of mining operations. The risk 
of an institution playing the role of savior 
and claiming technological or infrastructural 
superiority to teach less developed countries 
would fit with Wallerstein’s key theoretical 
components of core-based exploitation. Also, 
as MNCs act with self-interests in mind, both 
in regard to reporting and tangible mineral 
extraction, a similar skepticism of NGOs’ 
objectives for releasing information is valid. 
For example, as of 2017, over ninety global 
financial institutions actively support EITI’s 
mining revenue disclosure platform, leading 
to potential postulations of the organization’s 
monetary conflicts of interest (“Investors’ 
Statement on Transparency,” 2015). Simi-
larly, non-governmental organizations often 
carry the burden of taking a top-down un-
derstanding of development situations into 
projects, consequentially becoming more of 
a hindrance than a help to underdeveloped 
countries (“The Status of Human Rights,” 
n.d.). While recognizing the possibility of an 
occasional outlier, non-governmental organi-
zations involved in mining transparency pri-
oritize ethical interests and logic to advocate 
for public disclosure. Tangible statistics and 
evidence of governmental and investor coop-
eration in these programs prove the validity 
of such a cause. 
International non-governmental orga-
nizations challenge multinationals’ selec-
tive release of data about mining activities. 
NGO and IGO-initiated programs seek to 
hold multinational corporations accountable 
through regulation of mineral extraction. As 
both actors are parts of the developed core, 
the battle between the two takes pressure off 
the relationship between core and periphery, 
shifting the tension to the core. Since the im-
plementation of EITI standards in 2008 and 
subsequent reports on tax policy in Zambia, 
the Zambian Mining Code has reintroduced 
corporate income tax and decreased royalty 
rates, creating a more equitable mining sec-
tor (Baxter et al. 2016). The EITI, a product 
of the Norway-based EITI Association, has 
goals to strengthen and keep governments 
accountable in the extractive sector (“Gov-
ernance of the EITI,” n.d.). By challenging 
potentially exploitative foreign interests in 
Central African mining, international efforts 
for transparency illustrate a commitment to 
addressing problematic power imbalances in 
the industry. Wallerstein’s theory maintains 
capitalist interests will insure core dominance 
at the expense of developing economies, but 
these “core versus core” interactions between 
MNCs and NGOs introduce another non-ex-
ploitative relationship, beneficial to develop-
ing countries.
Even if transparency programs originate 
outside the realms of the state, the consequen-
tial outcomes of such initiatives can be ben-
eficial and encouraging to localized efforts 
for mining transparency. With multinational 
economic interests dictating state policy and 
publicity, small-scale initiatives can collabo-
rate with externally based transparency pro-
grams for a mutually beneficial relationship. 
For example, the Carter Center, based in the 
United States, partners with an independent 
research association, Moabi DRC, to work 
with various civil society groups, govern-
ments, and private organizations to document 
mining activities in rural regions of the DRC. 
The project has accumulated over 800 reports 
in the Congo Mines database (“Virtual Infor-
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mation Portal,” n.d.). In Zambia, the Publish 
What You Pay coalition, or PWYP (also ac-
tive in the DRC), unites fourteen Zambian 
civil society organizations to supplement 
EITI records and initiate collective action 
against discrepancies in reporting (“Publish 
What You Pay,” n.d.). The relationships be-
tween internationally based organizations 
such as the Carter Center and PWYP show 
cooperative methods of dealing with short-
falls in transparency. Working in accordance 
with small-scale projects to address account-
ability problems within the mining sector, 
NGOs and IGOs can use advanced platforms 
to highlight industry issues and local griev-
ances.
Advocates for maintaining state credi-
bility could argue against the state’s respon-
sibility for initiating national transparency 
proposals if other reputable legislation was 
adequate. Post-privatization, individual in-
vestors own many of the mines between 
Zambia and the DRC, reducing state owner-
ship. Thus, advocates raise a viable question 
of the nation’s need to regulate the industry 
with state resources, financial or otherwise. 
Since legislative changes in 1995, Zambia’s 
Mining Code has limited governmental in-
tervention to a regulatory role rather than 
participatory to coincide with the changes in 
state to private ownership (Ndulo, 2013). The 
Democratic Republic of Congo took a similar 
position in 2008, citing financial feasibility in 
relation to liberalization in the mining sector 
as reasoning for moving to a more regulato-
ry position in the industry (Journal Officiel 
de la République Démocratique du Congo, 
2008). Yet, while both countries have chosen 
indirect roles in the extractive sector, mining 
activities and revenue directly impact nation-
al governments and citizens. Thus, the states 
have a responsibility to produce transparent 
data about national and corporate agreements. 
With this argument in mind, state-initiated 
transparency efforts are just as necessary as 
externally initiated regulatory frameworks. 
MNCs and the governments of investing 
nations have undergone pressure for public 
disclosure of mining activities, enough to cre-
ate requirements for mineral importation and 
mining agreements. The push for transparen-
cy shows a value of public disclosure is not 
limited to local citizens. Section 1504 of the 
American legislation commonly referred to 
as the Dodd-Frank Act lays out explicit claus-
es of “public availability of information” for 
American companies to comply with when 
negotiating mining contracts, requiring com-
plete disclosure of financials, time, and logis-
tics of the project per annum (Dodd-Frank 
Wall Street Reform, p. 847).  Without these 
records, discrepancies in reporting can allow 
for potential economic damage. For example, 
the current Mining Code in the Democratic 
Republic of Congo allowed for a loss of 1.36 
billion U.S. dollars between 2010 and 2012, 
due to a lack of reporting between Canadian 
Banro Corporation and the Congolese pres-
ident. (Müller-Koné, 2015, p. 156). Global 
pressure to release mining documents creates 
an accountability structure with the potential 
to uncover and rectify financial losses. These 
disclosures paired with formal state regula-
tion of mineral extraction would improve the 
nature and efficiency of mining investments. 
As legislation such as the Dodd-Frank 
Act suggests, regulatory efforts to publicize 
mining activity is in the best interests of the 
investing multinational companies. Legally 
obligated to provide risk assessment for in-
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vestors, MNCs must provide public records 
of business transactions. To balance responsi-
bility, Zambian and Congolese governments 
could argue the necessity for more corporate 
involvement in reporting, subsequently shift-
ing some obligation to mining companies. 
For example, of the five companies invest-
ed in the nine largest mines in Zambia, three 
have published reports available to the public, 
and all three companies are based outside of 
Zambia, showing a lack of domestic reporting 
(“African Mining Project Database,” 2010). 
Also, based on a 2015 statement of support 
to EITI, ninety-three international investing 
companies recognize the value of transpar-
ent reporting in the extractives sector (“In-
vestors’ Statement on Transparency,” 2015). 
With the legal and corporate requirements at 
hand, companies should push for transparen-
cy within the sector. Declarations such as the 
aforementioned set a corporate standard for 
other companies to strive towards. Collab-
orative efforts between MNCs and national 
governments to increase transparency could 
increase the scope and productivity of such 
programs.
Taking part in transparency initiatives 
such as EITI increases the international cred-
ibility of states, inviting continued invest-
ments. Mining companies hope for a favor-
able, risk-averse financial environment for 
investors. Operating in fifty-two countries 
around the world, EITI compliance offers a 
globally recognized standard for transpar-
ency, incentivizing countries and companies 
to become affiliated with the program. The 
program has increased reporting on mining 
activities, seeing marked progress in partic-
ipation. In the seven years since the DRC 
committed to EITI membership, the num-
ber of reporting companies in the extractive 
sector (oil, gas, and mining) has increased 
450%, from 26 companies to 118, leading 
to higher reported revenues as well (“Ex-
tractive Industries Transparency Initiative,” 
n.d.). EITI holds multinational corporations 
accountable by essentially peer pressuring 
competitors into releasing mining statistics 
and matching the data with numbers released 
by state governments to uncover financial 
discrepancies (“Frequently Asked Ques-
tions,” n.d.). Well-established transparency 
initiatives, often originating in core states, 
possess the leverage to keep multinational 
corporations accountable to investors and 
the host countries. As emphasized by EITI’s 
success, non-governmental organizations can 
prove beneficial to peripheral nations through 
the implementation of effective mining dis-
closures. 
DISCUSSION
Accountability in the Mining Sector
Multinational investment in the extractive 
industries in Zambia and the Democratic Re-
public of Congo instigates a cycle of resource 
exploitation used mainly for the benefit of 
investment companies in already developed 
nations. MNCs originate from developed cap-
italist countries and are better equipped to in-
filtrate and manipulate markets rich in natural 
resources. With the privatization of mines in 
both countries, the regulatory role of the state 
becomes convoluted and less defined, thus 
giving more control to mining corporations. 
As foreign companies statistically dominate 
mine ownership in both countries, mineral 
exploitation can be threatening to domestic 
livelihoods. The movement of capital and 
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resources from the periphery to the core is a 
characteristic of Wallerstein’s world-systems 
theory. Consistent with world-systems theory, 
movement of mineral wealth from the periph-
eral economies to core-dominated, interna-
tional markets leaves the economies of coun-
tries like Zambia and the DRC dependent upon 
investing companies. Without significant state 
involvement in the regulation and surveillance 
of the industry, mining companies can contin-
ue the cycle of resource exploitation.
The protocol for disclosing information 
about mining activities in both countries 
also follows a trend of core-periphery rela-
tionships within world-systems theory: the 
mimicry of the core’s economic strategies by 
periphery states. Actors outside the physical 
borders and regulatory trajectory of the state 
instigate the majority of legislation geared 
towards producing transparency of mining 
operations through inter-governmental plat-
forms like the United Nations and World 
Bank or through independent research think-
tanks. Mining companies, typically located in 
developed countries, are legally compelled to 
release statistical reports, and therefore must 
instigate programs reporting on mining ac-
tivities as well. As world-systems theory also 
critiques capitalism, the reports of mining 
companies also reflect capitalist objectives of 
profit and market expansion first, before fo-
cusing on the needs and development of local 
communities. Representing the core, these 
developed organizations are supposed to pro-
vide models of transparency initiatives for 
mineral-rich states like Zambia and the DRC 
to replicate. MNCs and other reporting or-
ganizations instigate the already established 
protocol for public disclosure in these states 
and expect compliance.
The mining sector’s privatized structure 
grants companies direct control of mining 
activities but leaves regulatory responsibil-
ities to the state. Amid highly concentrated 
foreign involvement in the industry, an or-
chestrated effort for operational transparen-
cy by Zambian and Congolese governments 
would build state accountability. Several sig-
nificant programs focused on promoting the 
availability and accessibility of public min-
ing data have engineered the support of both 
states but originate outside national borders 
and jurisdiction. While cooperating with ini-
tiatives like EITI, neither state shows a clear 
intention of creating a nationally established 
push towards regulatory programs designed 
for transparency. The lack of economic sta-
tistics, historical records, and reports avail-
able to interested consumers on archival and 
government websites introduces postulations 
of state passivity on the topic of mining re-
porting. With current international critiques 
of the political policies and competencies 
of both countries, but particularly the DRC, 
initiatives to fully disclose mining activities 
and address problems in the industry would 
increase credibility in international eyes and 
improve the sustainability of the mining sec-
tor. Subsequently, more complete reporting 
could improve the success rates of research 
and development initiatives in the regions. 
Advocacy for Proactive Regulatory 
Reforms
The national governments of Zambia and 
the DRC should proactively monitor report-
ing on mining activities. While the state’s role 
in the industry has shifted to more of a reg-
ulatory nature, neither nation has instigated 
governmental policies to keep multinational 
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corporations in check through transparent 
legislation about mining operations. Inde-
pendent researchers and NGOs recognize 
the potential for corporate, capitalist influ-
ences of multinational companies upon min-
ing legislation and resource extraction. The 
Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative 
incentivizes many countries worldwide, in-
cluding Zambia and the DRC, to annually re-
lease data regarding foreign investment in the 
mining sector (“Extractive Industries Trans-
parency Initiative Institute,” 2016). The re-
ports highlight tax code and legal agreements 
between state governments and mining com-
panies in order to analyze mine ownership 
but have historically run into obstacles to full 
disclosure (“Rapport annuel d’avancement,” 
2015). By researching mine ownership, an 
internationally prominent program such as 
EITI requires the state to scrutinize the prac-
tices of mining companies. Non-govern-
mental publication of industry research and 
statistics should motivate state governments 
to investigate potential regulatory loopholes 
and shady business agreements in the mining 
industry. 
Investors and consumers should hold 
multinational corporations accountable for 
operations in Zambia and the DRC, demand-
ing the release of mining contracts and com-
pany decisions for public scrutiny. With so-
cial pressure from shareholders, companies 
may see value in releasing clear mining data. 
Thus, motivating civil society to pressure 
MNCs to release potentially incriminating 
data about mining operations would advance 
consistent standards for transparency. Exter-
nal interests drive corporate action and social 
policy in these countries more than domestic 
concerns (Amuwo, 2009). Similarly, while 
this research shows trends of production 
from internationally originated transparen-
cy initiatives like EITI, the programs tend 
to prioritize and praise Western goals for ac-
countability, even if inapplicable to many Af-
rican societies (Idemundia, 2009). A demand 
for MNC accountability ought to come from 
the shareholders the companies seek to im-
press. Transparent data accompanies a smart 
investment and MNCs should recognize the 
value of releasing all data to the public. Con-
sequently, the companies may instigate de-
velopment or change the trajectory of mining 
projects to further satisfy consumers.
Regardless of economic benefits stem-
ming from MNC investments, Zambia and 
the DRC should recognize the value of trans-
parent reporting and choose to prioritize the 
publishing of complete mining data. If this 
study’s argument is valid and the release of 
information about mining activities con-
stitutes a battleground between corporate 
interests and non-governmental agendas, 
the states develop mining policies to bal-
ance both arguments. As foreign companies 
own forty of the forty-seven major mines 
between the two countries, Zambia and the 
DRC could appear shackled to multinational 
interests rather than domestic needs, based 
on state revenue and export statistics (“Afri-
can Power Mines Project Database,” 2010). 
The nations also depend upon the aid and 
research of non-governmental organizations 
but are able to maintain sovereign control 
due to a wealth of natural resources and ex-
pectant investors seeking profit, as evident by 
the trends leading to foreign mine ownership 
within the borders of Zambia and the DRC 
(Le Billon, 2006, pp. 95-96). Transparent re-
porting should become a normative practice 
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within the mining sectors of both countries 
to showcase national control despite the in-
volvement of foreign actors, like multina-
tional mining companies. The credibility of 
the state, in respect to local populations and 
the world, would increase, as would mining 
sustainability and development. 
CONCLUSION
Foreign interests influence Zambian and 
Congolese economies, dictating mineral ex-
traction through mine ownership and attempt-
ing to control the publication of mining data. 
However, international interests do not nec-
essarily have to take an exploitative stance as 
Immanuel Wallerstein’s theory suggests. The 
transferal of power and mine ownership from 
the state to multinational companies has per-
mitted resource exploitation, and NGOs and 
IGOs informally regulate the industry by cre-
ating standards for publishing otherwise miss-
ing data. By way of establishing transparency 
initiatives to make mining revenue and data 
accessible to the public eye, these external 
actors seek to benefit the mining sector, the 
workers, and the host countries through clear 
reporting. Investors and consumers in the de-
veloped world also benefit from comprehen-
sive data and can push to hold multinational 
corporations and governments accountable 
through advocating for transparent mining 
reports. The mining industry in Zambia and 
the Democratic Republic of Congo, while 
struggling to maintain economic, social, and 
political credibility, can take steps to address 
issues in the industry through efforts to in-
crease transparent reporting across the sector.
Furthermore, a subsequent study could in-
vestigate the effects of transparency programs 
upon local development and the frequency of 
mining reforms. With an increase in transpar-
ent data available to investors, consumers, 
and miners, an accompanying change in the 
environment can be expected. The research 
could take a case study approach, analyzing 
the communities surrounding specific mines 
or within particularly mineral-dense regions. 
On-the-ground interviews and news reports 
from local miners and families would illus-
trate whether specific developmental changes 
within communities occurred over time due 
to the implementation of a specific trans-
parency standard such as EITI. Regarding 
the current study, research into the tangible 
effects of transparency programs could fur-
ther incentivize countries and companies to 
engage in such initiatives. Similarly, if the 
Zambian and Congolese governments rec-
ognized a correlation between community 
development and mining transparency, state 
support for clear reporting could increase 
and subsequently benefit the industry. With 
collaborations for research and develop-
ment between NGOs, state governments, and 
MNCs, mining in the Central African Cop-
perbelt could improve, from the bottom-up. 
Then, as shoppers worldwide peruse aisles 
lined with glittering gadgets, they could have 
confidence in the integrity of the products, 
stemming from transparent, accessible infor-
mation about sourcing and production. With 
this result, even Wallerstein could add an ex-
ception to his rules.
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